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1A BRIEF ESSAY ON THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Vincenzo Vinciguerra**
“Time has an unusual limitation,
It must begin and end at
some real points or it must be
conceived of as cyclical in nature,
endlessly allowing the repetition
of patterns of possibilities”1
I) INTRODUCTION
This essay will briefly address the issue of time in some fundamental international 
conventions on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). I will concentrate primarily on four of the 
numerous international conventions according to the importance the time factor assumes within this 
framework, and to the relevance these conventions assume in regard to IPRs in the international 
arena. 
In the first part I will introduce two characteristic ideas of time that we have inherited from 
philosophical thought. I will also describe how the “linearity,” one characteristic time can assume, 
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2might be a possible way to think of the law system. I will not delve into philosophical aspects of 
this issue, because they are merely a cue to analyze the issue of time in this context. 
In the second part I will detail some of the most important international conventions on IPRs 
only as far as the relevant time-related aspects are concerned, and I will leave all other aspects and 
details of the subject matter to the existing literature.
In the third and last part, I will ask if time, as implemented in the IPR conventions, might be 
construed as circular rather than as a unidirectional straight line. I will suggest that time, whatever 
the shape carved out by these conventions, is a fundamental part of IPRs and not a mere ancillary 
element of it. All IPRs are deeply embedded in the time factor. Rights and time are so related that 
rights would be abridged if the role played by time was underestimated.
II) TIME AND LAW
a) Lightness and Heaviness of Time 
The concept of Time always has been central in human thought, and different ideas and 
conceptions of time have been developed in the fields of philosophy, science and literature. For 
example, in the philosophical field time has been considered as a gauge of the movement: “time is 
the numeration of continuous movement”2 according to what comes before and to what comes 
later.3 On the other hand, time has been thought by St. Augustine to be “distensio animi,” the 
internal flow of the conscience.4 Furthermore, in literature time has been thought by M. Proust, in 
the wake of the French philosopher H. Bergson, in terms of an interior experience that can be 
2 See Aristotle “Physics” Book 4, 223b:1 (Robin Waterfield trad., Oxford University Press Ed., 1996) See generally: 
http://www.phy.syr.edu/courses/modules/LIGHTCONE/aristotle.html (last visited November12, 2004.)
3 See Sergio Peroncini, “La Formula ‘ora per allora’ nel Diritto Pubblico: le diverse tipologie di provvedimenti ‘ora per 
allora’” [‘nunc pro tunc’Doctrine in Public Law I: Different Kind of ‘nunc pro tunc’Judgements] Collana problemi 
attuali di diritto Amministrativo,11, Ed. Scientifiche italiane, 1995.
4 Id. at 11
3grasped only by intuitive memory; as with the field of science, it is dominated by the contra position 
between the Newton’s Universal time and the Einstein’s theory of relativity.5
It is common to employ metaphors, such as “linearity” and “circularity,” to describe Time. 
In fact, time can be thought of as running ahead in a straight line or, on the other hand, time can be 
thought of as a bent line that turns in a circle. 
Milan Kundera referred to this dichotomy using the metaphors of lightness and heaviness.6
The circular time is heavy because if
 “every second of our lives recurs an infinite number of times, we are nailed to 
eternity as Jesus Christ was nailed to the cross. It is a terrifying prospect. In the world 
of eternal return the weight of unbearable responsibility lies heavy on every move we 
make. That is why Nietzsche called the idea of eternal return the heaviest of 
burdens.”7
Every action a person takes is destined to recur repeatedly, and since the event is going to 
recur inexorably, the moment, in which a choice must be taken, will bear a “heavy” responsibility.
 By contrast, time may be thought to run ahead in a straight line, which does not loop back 
into itself.
“Putting it negatively, the myth of eternal return states that a life which 
disappears once and for all, which does not return, is like a shadow, without weight, 
dead in advance, and whether it was horrible, beautiful, or sublime, its horror, 
sublimity, and beauty mean nothing. We need take no more note of it than of a war 
between two African kingdoms in the fourteenth century, a war that altered nothing in 
5 Id. at 11-12
6 See Andrea Giansanti, “Tempo Leggero / Tempo Pesante. Tempo dell’economia, tempo della fisica: irreversibilità, 
omogeneizzazione”, Feb 11, 2003, unpublished hand out for ISUFI’s PhD clasees.
7 See Milan Kundera, “The Unbearable Lightness of Being”, 5  (Miachael Henry Heim Trad. Perennial Classic Ed. 
1984)
4the destiny of the world, even if a hundred thousand blacks perished in excruciating 
torment.”8
This means that if the stupidity of a war such as the above mentioned is not going to repeat 
itself, then it can be conscientiously forgiven and forgotten, because is never going to happen 
again.9
“[I]s heaviness truly deplorable and lightness splendid?”10 As the author writes: “the only 
certainty is: the lightness/weight opposition is the most mysterious, most ambiguous of all.”11
b) The System of Law and its Time 
  Is it possible to apply the metaphor of the opposition lightness/heaviness to the legal 
system12? If so, is it the legal system itself linear or nonlinear and how does the legal system deal 
with time13?
A system of law is a possible group and arrangement of bodies of laws, rules and 
prescriptions.14 The “system of law” is an ideal rational ordered group of laws. Of course, different 
kind of systems of law, different orders, may be envisaged.
Linear conception is a way, among others, to think of a legal order, of a system of law.15 The 
basic idea is to conceive the law as a science, such as Physics is deemed a natural science. To 
accomplish this goal, the legal system is (thought and) arranged more geometrico, in a complete 
8 Id. at 3
9 See Giansanti supra n. 6 at 2.
10 Id. at 5
11 Id. at 6
12 See Achille de Nitto, “Diritto dei Giudici e diritto dei Leegislatori”, 127, Argo Ed., 2002.
13 See Prof. A. de Nitto, address at a PhD class, hold at ISUFI, Lecce, Mars 11, 2003. See also e.g.Lorenzo Carnelli, 
“Tempo e Direito” [Time and Law], (Erico Maciel trad., José Konfino Ed., 1960).
14 See e.g. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), Legal Order.
15 See de Nitto supra n. 11 at 132, 137 (“il comando si presume chiaro, ed il flusso prescrittivo ininterrotto, rapido e, 
soprattutto, lineare.”)
5ordered system, in a taxonomic order.16 According to Prof. Langdell, dean at Harvard University 
Law School at the end of the XIX century, “it is indispensable to establish at least two things: first 
the law is a science. Secondly, that all the available materials of that science are contained in the 
printed books.” 17 In others words, law is “a complete, formal, and conceptually ordered system that 
satisfies the legal norms of objectivity and consistency.”18 The same idea underpins all the civil law 
codes (which have their roots in the French illuministic civil code) claiming completeness and no 
flaws, gaps or lacunas whatsoever. All the answers to every practical problem and cases are - Prof. 
Langdell would say - in the civil code.
One way to think about a nonlinear order may be through a metaphor employed by Fredrick 
von Hayek.19 According to the economist, a contra position exists between systems he calls “Taxis” 
and other ones he calls “Cosmos.”20 The former is a system with a specific aim; all the components 
of the system are coordinated to contribute to that aim. On the contrary, the “cosmos” is a 
spontaneous order, a “humoured” system.21 It is not a system geometrically and rigidly regimented 
by strict rules with specific aims. 22 It is a kind of order in which – because its nature - non rational 
elements find a proper arrangement therein, such as the trust of the market23 and the goodwill of 
businesses.
The idea of a reasonable system, as opposed to a rational system,24 vigorously sustained by 
the von Hayek’s cosmos, has been sustained by other schools of thoughts in Europe as well as in the 
16
 “Reasoning more geometrico was the model proposed to philosophers desirous of constructing a system of thought 
which might attain to the dignity of a science.” See Ch. Perelman, L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, “The New Rhetoric. A Treatise 
on Argumentation”, 1, (University of Notre Dame press Ed., John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver Trad., 1958, 1969)
17 See Gary Minda “Postmodern Legal Movements”, 13, NY Univ. Press Ed., 1995, for an accurate account of the main 
American jurisprudential school in the twentieth century.
18
 Id.
19 See de Nitto supra n.11 at 130
20 See F. A. von Hayek, “Legge, Legislazione e Libertà “[Law, Legislation and Liberty], Il Saggiatore Ed, 1986 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul Trad., London 1973-1979)
21 See de Nitto supra n. 11 at 130. See von Hayek supra n. 18 (According to Von Hayek a spontaneous orders, such as a 
legal order as well as an economic system, can only be generated and efficiently run by “abstract norms” of interaction 
among the “aimed systems.”)
22 See de Nitto supra n. 11 at 130. (the author distinguishes between a “rational” positive order as opposed to a 
“reasonable” positive order)
23 See de Nitto supra n.12 at 141
24 See de Nitto supra n 12  at 130
6United States. For example, the American Realist Movement in the 1920s and 1930s25 strongly 
opposed the formalist conception of law and more recently, among the others, the Legal Feminist 
Movement proposed a contextual and subjective approach in construing the law.26
 In sum, it seems that the contra position formal versus non-formal system of law (linear / 
non-linear) has been always important27 and it resurfaces periodically.28
c) Law and Metaphors
Apart from the contraposition of thoughts within all the possible arrays of variations,29 it 
seems that the idea of a linear, straightforward system has been “absorbed” and implemented in the 
language, in the legal jargon. 30
If one look at the legal words that are used everyday, it might be find out that these words 
express those purposes of perfection, taxonomic order before mentioned, heredity of a long past 
tradition.
The word right, as it is used in the law schools and courts, means “a legal entitlement to 
have or obtain something or to act in a certain way.”31 However, right also means “conformity with 
justice or morality.”32 It stands for: “in accordance with fact, reason, or true, correct” and “in a 
straight line; directly.”33
25 See Minda supra n. 15. at 25.
26 Id. at. 132.
27
 See Michael Steven Green “Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal System” 54, Alabama Law Review, 365, 2003, 
testifying the topicality of the problem.
28
 It is interesting that in the same period of time of the Legal Realist Movement, Hans Kelsen wrote his “Reine 
Rechtslehr“, one of the powerful theories upholding a “tough” legal formalism.
29 See generally Minda supra  n. 15.
30 See de Nitto, supra n. 12 at 127.
31
 THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, 1467, Oxford Univ. Press  Ed., (2001)
32
 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, 719, Dell Pub. Ed.  (2001)
33 Id. (emphasis added)
7The word rule, as used in the law schools, means “an authoritative direction for conduct or 
procedure”34 (eventually given by law….) However, it also means “a statement that describes what 
is true in most or all cases.”35
Ruler means “one that rules of governs” (presumably by making laws and bestowing rights) 
but also means a “straightened strip for drawing straight lines and measuring lengths.”36
Standard is used in the legal jargon as to mean “a level of quality or attainment” and “an 
idea of thing used as a measure, norm or model (…).”37 But it also means “a principle of conduct 
informed by notions of honour and decency” or “an object that is supported in an upright way”.38
In other words, these lemmas are used in the legal jargon as metaphors. Metaphor in Greek 
means “to transport”, “to convey.”39 In this instance the meaning that right (in the legal sense) 
conveys is given by the other meaning I referred to above: conformity with justice, true, correct. 
Right sustained by the State power is a “rule”, “edge,” something that neatly divides the right from 
the awry, the right from the wrong.40
Interestingly, the same use of the word right as a metaphor can be found in the French word 
“droit,” the Spanish word “derecho,”41 the German word “reicht” and the Italian word “diritto.”42 It 
is not a coincidence. All the terms share the same idea of linearity and all of them share the 
metaphorical meaning carried by the original Latin word directum.43
Thus, “right” is the opposite of wrong, false, bent, askew, awry. Using a mathematical 
metaphor, namely that a straight line is the shortest way to link two points on a plane, the rule of 
34 Id at 728.
35 Id.  (emphasis added)
36 Id.  (emphasis added)
37
 THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, 1660, Oxford Univ. Press  Ed., (2001
38 Id. (emphasis added)
39 See µ, William Crightor, “NEW GREEK-ENGLISH DICTIONARY”, Zeno Ed., (1966).
40 See Federico Spantigati, “Analisi del  diritto dell’economia” [Analysis of the Economic Law], 3, forthcoming.
41
 Interesting, in Spanish the word “derecho” means both “straight” and, with a slight correction, “right” (derecha). See 
“THE OXFORD-DUDEN PICTORIAL SPANISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY”, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985.
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8law is thought to solve a practical case in the easiest and straight possible way.44 This would be 
possible so long as the legal order is construed as a systematic, flawless order. Given a hypothetical 
case in point, knowing the rule to apply, one and only one answer will be possible. Accordingly, 
also time must be thought as linear as the legal system itself. Such an ordered and coherent system 
leaves no room for other interferences. Therefore, time in the legal system is thought as an 
irreversible flow of time from the past to the present and from the present to the future, as a 
unidirectional temporal sequence that cannot return.45
III) TIME IN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
a) The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
The Paris convention, of March 20, 1883, came into effect on July 7, 1884 and, since then, 
has been revised many times, most recently at Stockholm in 1967.46
The purpose of the convention was, as its title suggests, formulating principles to accord 
protection of Industrial Property. 47
A major achievement of the convention is the establishing of an international priority system 
for registration of industrial property.48 Before the Paris convention was implemented, finding
patent protection outside the boundaries in which the patent was first filed it was almost impossible. 
44 Id. at 138
45 See Francesco La Valle, Nss. Dig. It., successione, 635, 1971.
46 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (as revised on July 
14, 1967 in Stockholm) See e.g. George Hendrick Christian Bodenhausen , “Guide to the Application of the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as revised at Stockholm in 1967,” United International Bureaux for 
the Protection of Intellectual Property Ed., 1968.
47 See Paris convention art 1 (2). “Industrial Property” is a label that encompasses some legal institutions: patent, utility 
model, industrial design, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indication of source or appellation of origin.. Since 
the patent may be considered the archetype of industrial property I will employ it as the main example in examining all 
the international conventions regarding industrial property.
48 See e.g. Stephen P. Ladas, “Patents, trademarks, and related rights: national and international protection,” Harvard 
Univ. Press Ed., 1975.
9In fact, it was very difficult and expensive (put in context at the end of the XIX century) to apply 
for a patent, at the same time, in two or more different countries. Moreover, failure to file 
simultaneously in all the countries where protection were sought, could have (and often did) 
deprived the invention of the required novelty49 in countries other than the one in which the 
application was made.50
The Paris Convention solved this problem establishing the “right of priority”:
“Any person who has duly filed an application for a patent (…) in one of the countries of the 
union (…) shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the other countries, a right of priority during the 
periods hereinafter fixed”51 “Consequently, any subsequent filing in any of the other countries of 
the Union before the expiration of the periods referred to above shall not be invalidated by reason 
of any acts accomplished in the interval, in particular, another filing, the publication or exploitation 
of the invention, the putting on sale of copies of the design (…).”52
These provisions mean that, for example, if X applies for a patent in country (A), she will 
retains, for one year, her right to apply for the same invention in all the other countries of the Union, 
despite what might happen after the first date of application in country (A), such as the publication 
or the exploitation of the work. This means that all the activities that would normally defeat the 
novelty of the invention, in the absence of any agreements, are irrelevant.
The first application, the one that triggered the process, is considered to establish the date on 
which the application was filed. Interestingly, that effect of the application is retained “whatever 
may be the subsequent fate of the application”.53 It means that when a new application is completed
in one country of the Union, it is deemed as if it had been filed on the date the first application was 
filed, although the original application had been withdrawn or cancelled. 
49
 “Novelty” is, along with “utility” and “non-obviousness,” one of requirements for patentability. “The novelty test 
determines whether the claimed invention is unpatentable because it was made before, sold before (…) or otherwise 
disqualified by prior use or knowledge.” See Robert P. Merges, Peter S. Menell, Mark A. Lemley, “Intellectual Property 
in the New Technological Age” 112, Aspen Publisher Ed, 2003.
50 See Paul Goldstein, “International Intellectual Property Law”, 333, Foundation Press Ed., 2001. 
51 See Paris convention art 4 (a, 1), (emphasis added.) (The period of priority is fixed, for the patent, in twelve months.) 
52 Id. art 4 (b) (emphasis added.)
53 Id art  4(a),3
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Is this an example of circular time or, instead, is a fictio juris implemented here54?  A fictio 
juris is an assumption that considers as true something that cannot be true.55 Is it here implemented 
to assure coherency to the linear idea of time? Or is it the idea of linearity that forces us to think in 
term of fictiones? 
b) Patent Cooperation Treaty
The need to improve and strengthen the international patent system was one of the goals of 
the President Johnson’s administration, back in the mid 1960s. The President appointed a special 
commission to study the United States patent system and the commission came up with the 
recommendation that, inter alia, “the United States [should] promote direct interim steps toward the 
ultimate goal: a universal patent including harmonization of patent practices.”56 That was the 
starting point that led to the diplomatic conference in June of 1970 where the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT) came to light.57
Once again, the time factor here plays a fundamental role.58
In Professor Paul Goldstein words:  “The most significant advantage [of the PCT] is the 
additional time provided before a final decision has to be made on the filing of individual 
application in different countries.”59 Hence, there is here no particular or original application of time 
factor but, still, time is one of the most important features that is “manipulated” in this treaty since 
it is acknowledge that time is a key element that greatly affect the right holder’s interest.
54 See La Valle supra n. 45 at 637 (quoting K. Helwig and  S. Pugliatti)
55 See  THE BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), fictio.
56
 Interesting but not surprisingly the same interest has prevailed in the international arena leading, years later, to the 
worldwide harmonization of IPRs through the Agreement on Trade Relate Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) (available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#TRIPs.) See Goldstein supra n. 50 at 353.
57 See Patent Cooperation Treaty, with Regulations, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645.  
58
 The PCT sets forth in art 4 that the applicant, beyond the year provided for by the Paris Convention, has bestowed 
with eight additional months (plus a preliminary search report) upon which grounding the decision on whether or not 
complete the filing in the designated countries. Since art. 27(7) and rule 4(7) does not compel to appoint a national 
attorney or agent until processing of the international application has stared in the designate national patent office, the 
saving of money is huge. Lot has been written about the PCT. See e.g. Goldstein supra n. 41 at 353.
59 Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
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c) The “Madrid Agreement” and “Madrid Protocol”
The purpose of the “Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks” 
(Madrid Agreement)60 is to simplify the international registration process of Trade Marks (TM).61
This pact enables - through the “application for international registration”62 - a trade mark 
owner, who is a national of any of the contracting countries, to secure protection for her TM, in all 
the contracting parties, through a single filing in its country of origin.63 The international 
application is received by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)64 that issues 
international registration and transmits it to the designated countries for examination.65
The United States did not adhere to the Madrid Agreement,66 and one of the reasons was the 
provision for “central attack”: if the home country registration is cancelled (or otherwise 
invalidated), registrations in all designated foreign countries will fall with it.67
The Protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement (Madrid Protocol),68 adopted in 1989, has 
modified the most objectionable features of the original agreement. The protocol now allows a TM 
owner, whose registration has been cancelled in the country of origin, to retain her international 
application and, thus, to fill a registration application in the designated countries, as if it had been 
filed on the date of the international registration. 
As in the Paris Convention, is a fictio juris employed, or may it be considered as an example 
of circular time? 
60 See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, April 14, 1891, (as revised at Stockholm, 
July 14, 1967) available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo./wo015en.htm.
61
 The term Trade Mark includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, the producers use to 
identify and distinguish her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by other and to indicate 
the source of the goods. For a definition of “service mark” the definition of TM must be applied, mutatis mutandis, to a 
service. See Merges, Menell, Lemley, supra n. 49 at 537.
62 See Madrid Agreement art. 1(2).
63 Id. 
64 Id. To be sure, the application is received by the International Bureau of Intellectual Property 
65 Id. art 3(4)
66
 See Goldstein supra n. at 471
67 See Madrid agreement art 6 (3) See Goldstein supra n. 50 at 472
68 See Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, June 28, 1989, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo016en.htm
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d) The nunc pro tunc and the related back doctrines
Both in the Paris convention and in the Madrid Protocol, something that had ceased to exist 
(the first application or the international registration, respectively)69 is deemed as a point of 
reference for the new application in the designated countries. Both in the Paris Convention and in 
the Madrid Protocol a no-longer-existent act is used as point of reference for the validity of a 
subsequent act.70
A different process happens with the nunc pro tunc and the relation back doctrine.
The nunc pro tunc judgment means “a procedural device by which the record of a judgment 
is amended to accord with what the judge actually said and did, so that the record will be 
accurate.”71 Something similar happens with the doctrine of relation back. In fact, it states that “an 
act done at a later time is, under certain circumstances, treated as though it occurred at an earlier 
time. In federal civil procedure, an amended pleading may relate back, for purposes of the statute of 
limitations, to the time when the original pleading was filed.” 72 In these instances, the application 
of these two doctrines is employed only if there is a mistake on a pre-existent document and this 
document is still legally existent.
According to these two doctrines, those past events, through a fictio juris, are considered as 
if they were effective and qualified in the way the present judgment does. Therefore, the problem of 
the effect of a past act is surmounted, again, by a mental construction. However, a characteristic of 
69 See art. 9quinquies, (first sentence)
70 But see supra Peroncini n. 3 at 144 ff
71 See under “Nunc pro tunc”, THE BLACK’S  LAW DICTIONARY, 8th Ed., 2004. See also 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 
123, according to which the purpose of the ‘nunc pro tunc’ judgement is “to alter a judgment actually rendered, or to 
correct an erroneous decision or judgment; and, generally speaking, the object or office of the entry is only to supply 
matters of evidence or to correct clerical misprisions, and not to supply omitted judicial action.”
72 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (c). Even though it’s possible the first document was void, I would argue that it would be 
partially void, only in regard of the mistake that the doctrine wants to correct. In the Paris convention, on the contrary, 
the application is considered totally void. See also, for an explanation of the rule, Steven S. Sparling, “Relation Back of 
‘John Doe’ Complaints inn Federal Court: What you don’t Know can Hurt You”, 19 Cardozo Law Review, 1235, 1997. 
(Even though it’s possible the first document was void, I would argue that it would be partially void, only in regard of 
the mistake that the doctrine wants to correct. In the Paris convention, on the contrary, the application is considered 
totally void.)
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the nunc pro tunc judgment seems to be that it”applies only when there is a past legal fact to which 
apply the present judgment.”73 It seems that it is impossible to produce out of thin air, without the 
existence of previous fact,74 a nunc pro tunc judgment. The same happens regarding the relation 
back doctrine.
By way of contrast, pursuant article 9quinquies of Madrid Protocol (and, mutatis mutandis, 
pursuant article 4 of Paris Convention) there are no past legal events (since they have been 
cancelled) to which refer the new effect. If thinking about it in terms of fictiones is possible, a 
“stronger” one perhaps is here implemented.75
Again, is it possible to think of these provisions as inverting the flaw of time? Maybe it is 
just a fascination, such as the fictio juris, and it is possible to qualify these events, one might argue,
as an hypothetical fact situations – with facts in a progressive order - to which the rule attaches a 
legal consequences.76 In this event, another “tool” is employed to adapt the system to the idea of 
linearity. As usual, it is a matter of the premises chosen and goals that are set.77
e) Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and its Application
Time factor also plays a fundamental role in the conventions protecting literary and artistic 
works.
73 The nunc pro tunc doctrine permits courts to enter orders having retroactive effect for the limited purpose of 
correcting a previously entered order which contained an error, omission, or a mistake. See Gagnon v. United States, 
193 U.S. 442 (1904); Brignardello v. Gray, 1 Wall. 627 (1864). See  also Matthias v. Railroad Retirement Board, 341 F. 
2d 243 (8th Cir. 1965). In a bankrupt case the Supreme Court of Nebraska hold that “Proper function of <<nunc pro tunc 
order>> is not to correct some affirmative action which court ought to have taken but is to correct record which has 
been made so that it will truly record action which was really had but which through some inadvertence or mistake has 
not been truly recorded” (emphasis added) Supreme Court of Nebraska, Application of Albert Roy Andrews, etc. Albert 
Roy Andrews, dba Andrews Transfer & Storage, Norfolk, Nebraska, Appellant, v. Nebraska State Railway 
Commission, Appellee. No. 35388. April 12, 1963.)
74 But see Peroncini supra n. 3 at 144 ff
75
 In fact, this provision pegs the new effect not to the past event (the original application no longer existing) but to a 
certain point in the past time (that only correspond with the period time of the old application). 
76
 This means that all the elements that must be met to trigger the legal protection are straight in the time, one after the 
other: progressively. (Fattispecie a formazione progressiva). See DIZIONARIO GIURIDICO De Franchis, fattispecie 
(…).
77 See de Nitto supra n.12 at 142
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 The Berne Convention is the first agreement for the protection of literary and artistic works. 
It was signed in Berne, Switzerland, on September 9, 1886, and has often been revised, most 
recently in the 1979.78
Berne Convention protects “every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, 
whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlet and other writing 
(…).”79 The Berne Convention (as developed along the time) vests the authors with an array of 
substantial rights such as the national treatment, the right of translation, reproduction, certain moral 
right etc.80 Moreover, the convention sets forth the minimal period of protection for artistic and 
literary works.81
Generally,82 a country does not have any obligations, absent international agreements, to 
protect a work by a foreign national or a work first published in another country. The protection 
consists in recognizing to the author of an artistic or literary work a bundle of rights that expands its 
effects in a certain span of time. No protection at all it is granted if the terms of protection will not 
be turn on in the country where protection is sought. Here, the Berne Convention steps in. 
According to article 18 the convention shall apply to the works of authorship that have not yet 
fallen into the public domain at the time of its enactment. Conversely, no protection will be granted 
to works fallen into public domain in the country where protection is claimed (though the work is 
still protected in the country of origin).83
78 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1886 (as revised at Paris, 
September 28, 1979). Available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo001en.htm.
79 See Berne convention art 2(1)
80 Id. art. 5, art. 8, art. 9, art.  6bis.
81
 In fact, copyright protection is limited in time.
82
 But see the French and German system of law where, because their philosophical premises underpinning IPRs, 
protection for at least some “moral rights” is unconditionally and universally extended. See e.g. Goldstein supra n 50
83
 See Berne convention, art 18,1 “This Convention shall apply to all works which, at the moment of its coming into 
force, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of protection.”
(2) If, however, through the expiry of the term of protection which was previously granted, a work has fallen into the 
public domain of the country where protection is claimed, that work shall not be protected anew”.
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Overlooking some of the implication of this provision, although important and source of 
many problems,84 it may be useful to briefly refer to a judicial case that may help in the 
understanding of the scope of this provision and the importance of the time factor in the copyright 
arena.
The case occurred before the German’s Federal Supreme Court in the 1978.85 The problem 
at hand was to decide if - within the legal framework given by the interference of the Berne 
Convention with other international agreements86 - the petitioner’s work still had protection in 
Germany.87
The German Supreme Court, holding in favour of the petitioner, recognized, as one of the 
most important point at hand, the significance of the term of protection in the copyright law. The 
Court held that “the term of protection [constitutes] a right in a work”88 and that the term of 
protection is not “merely a durational limitation of a right”89
According to the Court the substantial right conferred by the copyright would be deeply 
“affected” if the period of protection is miscounted and underestimated in its scope and duration. 
IV) CONCLUSION
As we saw, both in the Paris Convention and the Madrid Protocol a fictio juris is employed. 
I wonder whether fictio is like an “intellectual tool” used to explain something otherwise not 
84
 See Goldstein p. 193 (He points out that the retroactive protection is accorded by the convention to foreign works 
existent at the time the convention came into effect between the protecting country and the work’s country of origin so 
long as the requirements set forth by art. 18 are met.) It is also worthwhile to mention the “copyright in restored works”, 
pursuant 17 U.S.C. § 104A, that solve the problem of the protection of foreign works, when Berne Convention entered 
into force in the United States in the 1989, that had lost their United States copyright because the copyright owner had 
filed to comply with renewal formalities.
85
 Atlas Film & AV GmbH & Co. Verleih u. Vertrieb v. Janus Film u. Fernesehen Vertriebgesellschaft mbh. Case n. I 
ZR 97/76, 10 International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 358 (1979).
86
 See Universal Copyright Convention, Paris text, 1971, art XIX. Available at http://www.cni.org/ docs/ infopols/ 
US.Universal.Copyright.Conv.html
87 See Goldstein supra n. 50  at 188 ff  for a detailed comment on this case.
88 See. Goldstein supra n 50 at 191
89 Id
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explainable; an escamotage that must be used to reckon with the idea of linear time, since time in 
the legal system is usually thought of as an irreversible flow of time, from the past to the present 
and from the present to the future, as a unidirectional temporal sequence.90
Beside the suggestive imagery of the linear/circular time, in light of the aforementioned 
provisions and the decision of the German Supreme Court, the time-factor comes up to be a 
fundamental element of intellectual property rights. The matter at hand is substantial and does not 
concern how long the time of protection ought to be. The time-factor (whatever the length) 
underpins the interest of the IPRs holder and it conspires to shape the scope of protection given by 
law. Since the particular interest of the right holder is the starting point for the process that leads to 
the creation of the rule of law,91 the time factor is the essence of the “intellectual bundle of rights.”
90 See La valle supra n. 45 at 635
91 Bigliazzi Geri, Breccia, Busnelli, Natoli,  I, “Diritto Civile” [Private Law], p. 288, Utet Ed., (1986). 
